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multiples. We find that A-share IPOs are severely under-valued by issuers 
and underwriters at the offer, but over-valued by investors on the listing 
day. Both contribute to the severe under-pricing of IPOs in China. Our find-
ings are robust across stock exchanges, classification of firms, criteria for 
choosing matching firms; absence of CSRC regulation and B-share market 
prices, respectively. The results also show that those over-valued IPOs by 
investors on the listing day under-perform those under-valued IPOs in the 
long-run. 
Keywords: Chinese stock market, A-share IPO, Under-pricing
INTRODUCTION
Under-pricing of initial public offering (IPO) refers to a phenomenon 
where the initial market price of a newly listed stock exceeds its 
issue price. It was first documented by Stoll and Curley (1970), 
Reilly (1973), Logue (1973), and Ibbotson (1975), respectively. 
Such a study has become an important research agenda in the 
past three decades. Among others, Ritter and Welch (2002) give a 
detailed survey of IPO-related issues. Indeed, empirical evidence of 
under-pricings has been detected in many financial markets across 
countries. Loughran et al (1994) provide evidence of under-pricings 
of IPOs in 25 countries, highlighting lower IPO under-pricing in 
developed than in developing markets. More recently updated 
international average initial returns for more than 13 countries 
including China are available in the Ritter’s IPO homepage. Among 
such evidence of under-pricing, the degree of severe under-pricing of 
A-shares in China is the most alarming. 
Many researchers have reported consistent empirical evidence of 
under-pricing of A-share IPOs in China. For example, Mok and Hui 
(1998) find a high initial return of 289% for A-shares in Shanghai 
Stock Exchange between 1990 and 1993. Su and Fleisher (1999) 
find that the A-shares average initial return is astonishingly at 
948.59% from 1986 to 1996. Chen et al. (2001) find under-pricing 
of A-shares listed in the period 1991 to 1996 staggering at 335%. 
Chi and Padgett (2002b) find an average market-adjusted initial 
return of 129.16% in a sample of 668 IPOs from 1996 and 2000. 
And Liu and Li (2000) find an average market-adjusted initial return 
of 139.4% in a sample of 781 IPOs listed from 1991 to 1999. Chan 
et al. (2001) find the average initial return of A-shares between 1993 
and 1998 is 178%. Finally Wu (2001) studies A-share IPOs listed 
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between December 1990 and March 2000 and finds an average 
market adjusted initial return of 218.33%. Figure 1 displays the 
initial returns of Chinese A-shares IPOs by year in Wu (2001). It can 
be observed that the initial returns of IPOs listed before 1993 are 
extremely high. This implies that inclusion of such IPOs contributes 
to the extraordinarily high initial returns reported by Su and 
Fleisher (1999), and Chen et al. (2001), respectively.
However, findings on the long-run performance of Chinese A-
share IPOs are mixed. For example, Chen et al. (2000) find that A-
share IPOs listed from 1992 to 1995 under-perform the market after 
3 years of listing. Similarly, Gu (2003) finds that the 68 IPOs went 
public in 1994 under-perform the market by 53% and 57% after 3 
and 5 years of listing respectively. In contrast, other researchers find 
the opposite. Mok and Hui (1998) find that the under-priced IPOs 
under-perform the market as a whole in the first 75 trading days, 
but out-perform the market with a few percent above zero in the rest 
of the 350 holding days; whereas those over-priced IPOs also under-
perform the market in the first 20 trading days, but enjoy high ex-
cess returns in the rest of the 350 holding days. In addition, Chi and 
Padgett (2002a) find that A-share IPOs listed in 1996 and 1997 out-



















Note:  This chart graphs the index adjusted first-day returns of Chinese A-share 
IPOs up to 1999.  Data source: Wu (2001)
Figure 1. Initial Returns of Chinese A-Share IPOs by Year. 
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perform the market by 10.26% after 3 years of listing.  
Essentially there are two types of theoretical models used to ex-
plain the under-pricing of IPOs in general. One is based on the as-
sumption of asymmetric information, and the other on symmetric 
information. The former includes (1) signaling model, (2) winner’s 
curse model, and (3) principal-agent model. Allen and Faulhaber 
(1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Welch (1989), and Chemma-
nur (1993) employ signaling models to account for the high initial 
returns of IPOs, assuming that issuers have superior information 
on security value than the underwriters or investors.  New issues of 
high quality IPOs are under-priced in order to signal their quality to 
investors. In the winner’s curse model developed by Rock (1986) and 
Beatty and Ritter (1986), investors are assumed to be more informed 
than issuers and they are differentially informed among themselves. 
To induce investors to subscribe shares and thus ensure the launch 
a success, it is optimal for issuers to under-price IPOs.  Baron 
(1982) constructs the principal-agent model to offer an alternative 
explanation for IPO under-pricing. He assumes that issuers are less 
informed than underwriters. The issuers prompt to under-price 
IPOs so as to induce underwriters to put in the requisite effort to 
market shares. Recently, Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) construct 
a sentiment index based on six proxies for market sentiment 
orthoganized against a set of macroeconomic variables, and find 
that the sentiment index is significantly positively correlated to stock 
returns.
These well-established models have been applied to markets for 
IPOs in China. Many researches have tried to find evidence of se-
vere under-pricing of the Chinese A-share IPOs using asymmetric 
information models. For instance, nine studies examine the possibly 
negative relationship between under-pricing and ownership retained 
by issuers, as hypothesized in the signaling model. Five obtain the 
expected negative relationship, while four do not (see Chan et al. 
2001; Chau et al. 1999; Chen et al. 2001; Chi and Padgett 2002b; 
Gu 2003; Mok and Hui 1998; Su 1999; Su and Fleisher 1999; Wu 
2001). In addition, Chen et al. (2001), Chi and Padgett (2000b), Su 
and Fleisher (1999), and Wu (2001) examine the relationship be-
tween under-pricing and seasoned equity offerings. All the three ex-
cept Chi and Padgett (2000b) obtain the expected positive relation-
ship. 
Moreover, ten studies test the winner’s curse model by examining 
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the relationship between under-pricing and ballot ratio (reciprocal of 
oversubscription rate), and/or the relationship between under-pric-
ing and ex-ante uncertainty about the value of an issue (in addition, 
see Liu and Li 2000). If the winner’s curse model holds for the IPO 
markets in China, the former relationship should be negative, and 
the later positive. The variables used to measure ex-ante uncertainty 
include firm size, IPO size (proceeds from IPO or number of shares 
issued), firm age, and market risk around the offering. These studies 
find a broadly consistent negative relationship between under-pric-
ing and ballot ratio, a negative relationship between under-pricing 
and IPO size, and a positive relationship between under-pricing and 
market risk around offering of IPO. However, results concerning the 
relationship between under-pricing and firm size and firm age are 
mixed. In short, these ten studies do not provide strong evidence to 
support the winner’s curse model. More recently, Wu (2001) tests 
the principal-agent model by examining the relationship between 
under-pricing and reputation of underwriter. His results do not sup-
port the principal-agent model either.
Furthermore, several studies are conducted to investigate the high 
initial returns of A-shares using fundamental characteristics of the 
IPO markets in China. For example, Chan et al. (2001), Chen et al. 
(2001), Mok and Hui (1998), and Wu (2001) find a positive relation-
ship between the under-pricing and the time lag from offering to 
listing. And Chi and Padgett (2002b), Gu (2003), and Liu and Li (2000) 
attribute the severe under-pricing to the high demand for IPOs and 
limited investment opportunities of the investors in China. However, 
Gu (2003) does not provide empirical support for his conclusion. 
Nevertheless, Liu and Li (2000) and Chi and Padgett (2002b) find 
evidence of a negative relationship between under-pricing and bal-
lot ratio, thereby supporting the winner’s curse model. Moreover, 
Gu (2003) also claims that the bribery hypothesis contributes to the 
high initial returns of A-share IPOs. This is because managers and 
employees of the issuing companies are eligible to buy a portion of 
the initial offerings. As such, they have incentives to under-price the 
new issue for personal gains at the expense of the government. But 
Su and Fleisher (1999) argue that bribery may be a by-product of 
under-pricing.
As it is clear that the asymmetric information models seem do 
not provide convincing explanations for the severe under-pricing 
of A-share IPOs in China, the purpose of this study is to find some 
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alternative measures to investigate whether A-share IPOs are re-
ally under-valued at offering. As a matter of fact, Ritter and Welch 
(2002) deem it unlikely that asymmetric information theory is able 
to explain more than a few percent of IPO under-pricing. In par-
ticular, we adopt in this paper the methodology of comparable firm 
multiples proposed by Kim and Ritter (1999) and Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004) to assess the role played by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in under-valuing Chinese A-share 
IPOs at offering, and investigate the factors that contributed to the 
under-pricing of IPOs in China. The results show that the A-share 
IPOs in China are severely under-valued by issuers and underwrit-
ers, and that these IPOs are over-valued by investors on the listing 
day. Hence, both under-valuation by issuers and underwriters, and 
over-valuation by investors contribute to the severe under-pricing of 
IPOs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
highlights some institutional background of the IPO market in Chi-
na. Section 3 describes the data and the IPO valuation methodology. 
Section 4 presents empirical findings under the benchmark case 
and ranks performance of price multiples in valuating IPOs. It also 
performs sensitivity analysis of the benchmark findings across dif-
ferent exchanges, classification of firms, criteria for choosing match-
ing firms, CSRC regulations and B-share market prices. Section 5 
reports results on initial returns and long-run performance of IPOs. 
Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE IPO MARKET
In what follows we highlight some unique features of the emerging 
securities market in China pertaining to the under-pricing of IPOs.
 
Share Types
Since their inception in early 1990’s, Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) are the two national 
exchanges established to absorb and control capital for state owned 
enterprises (SOE), thereby improving their management and profit-
ability. In the last decade, the Chinese government has introduced 
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5 different types of shares SHSE and SZSE to raise money and to 
retain control over listed companies. These include government 
shares, legal entity shares, employee shares, A-shares, and B-
shares. Government shares are owned by the State Assets Manage-
ment Bureau (SAMB) and are non-tradable; Legal entity shares can 
only be held by other SOEs or the foreign partners of a Sino-foreign 
joint venture and are also non-tradable; Employee shares are issued 
to employees of IPO companies and prevented from being traded 
for a certain period of time (usually one year), and once employee 
shares are listed, they become the same as A-shares; A-shares are 
tradable common shares that can be held only by Chinese citizens; 
B shares are tradable only to foreign investors. From 1993, the Chi-
na Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) allows companies that 
satisfy certain requirements to issue shares on Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and other foreign exchanges. These shares are called H-
shares and N-shares, respectively.
   
Listing Procedure 
One notable characteristic of the Chinese IPO market is the 
unique selection process of listing companies. Based on economic 
development plans and other (even political and military) factors, 
the State Council Securities Committee (SCSC), the State Planning 
Commission (SPC), and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) jointly 
determine the total IPO quotas annually. The quotas are then 
allocated to individual provinces, municipalities, ministries in 
consideration of regional needs, regional development goals and 
provincial differences in production structure. Within each regional 
quota, the local securities authorities invite enterprises to request 
listings and then make a selection based on factors including 
perceived financing needs, previous operating performance, regional 
and national development objectives, societal concerns, and even 
personal relationships of enterprise management with government 
officials. However, the annual IPO-quota practice was cancelled by 
the CSRC on March 17, 2001. Since then any firm that satisfies the 
requirements stipulated in the Company Law and Securities Law 
may apply for listing. These requirements include: (a) The firm must 
make profits in the past three years; (b) capital stock must exceed 
50 million RMB; (c) at least 25% of capital stock (15% for firms 
whose capital stock exceed 400 million RMB) should be sold to the 
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public; and (d) no manipulation of accounts in the past 3 years.  
Long Time Lag Between Offering and Listing of IPO
The usual time lag between offering and listing of A-share IPOs 
has been alarmingly long. After making public offerings, the firms 
need wait in a queue to be floated. The average time lag reported 
by Wu (2001) is 350.76 days, which is much longer than the short 
duration ranging from a few days to a few weeks in the developed 
stock markets. Before 1993, the time lag could even be more than 
3 years (See Chen, Firth, and Kim 2001; Mok and Hui 1998). The 
listing time lag during this study period is with an average of 305 
days and the median of 34 days. 
High Demand for A-Share IPO 
The high demand for A-share IPOs may be caused by two major 
factors. One is due to the limited aggregate supply of IPOs as it is 
controlled by the government through the annual quota of IPO. The 
other can be explained by the shortage of alternative investment 
choices. It is common knowledge that before 1990, the Chinese 
investors can only invest in bank deposits and Treasury bond 
since the domestic financial markets are poorly developed and they 
are refrained from investing overseas due to capital control of the 
government. Muirin and Sommariva (1993) find that for the Chinese 
investors, the real returns on saving and Treasury bonds are 
actually negative because of the relatively high inflation rate. Hence, 
it is not surprising that many investors shift to holding securities 
for the expected higher returns after the establishment of Shanghai 
Stock and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in the early 1990’s.  
Allocation Methods
In what follows we provide detailed information on the allocation 
methods of A-share IPOs since they are very different from those 
used in the developed markets and have undergone many changes 
since the early 1990’s.
Basically a fixed pricing system was used to determine the offer 
prices of most A-share IPOs. Under the fixed price mechanism, 
issuers and underwriters decide a fixed offer price months before 
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the listing and there is no feedback mechanism to adjust the offer 
price. As required by the China Securities Regulatory Committee 
(CSRC), the offer price should be based on the following formula:
Offer price = EPS * P/E,
where P/E refers to the price-to-earnings ratio, and EPS is earnings 
per share. Note that the P/E ratios of most IPOs are usually set be-
tween 13 and 15 times according to regulations of the CSRC, with 
some exceptions specially approved by the CSRC. 
There were substantial changes in methods of computing EPS. 
Before 1996, EPS was based on forecasted earnings per share. On 
December 26, 1996, the CSRC published a notice which changed 
EPS to be based on the realized arithmetic average EPS in the past 
three years, that is EPSt = (EPSt-1 + EPSt-2 + EPSt-3)/3. On Septem-
ber 10, 1997, the CSRC changed the EPS calculation formula to: 
EPS = (0.7 * EPS in the year before the IPO + 0.3 * Forecasted EPS 
during the IPO year). In addition, on March 17, 1998, the CSRC 
further changed the EPS calculation formula to: EPS = Forecasted 
Earnings/(Total number of shares before IPO + Number of IPO 
shares*(12-month)/12), where ‘month’ is the month when IPO is of-
fered.
As regards the allocation mechanism, the lottery and pro rata 
mechanisms have been adopted. Conceivably the former allocates 
shares issued by lot and the latter allocates shares by pro rata. The 
difference lies in how shares are allocated in case of over-subscrip-
tion. But different lottery systems were adopted during different 
periods. For example, in 1991 and 1992, a lottery system based on 
fixed number of application forms was used. Under this arrange-
ment, each investor was allowed to purchase a limited number 
of lottery forms, and the lottery winners were entitled to a certain 
number of shares per winning form. On August 18, 1993 CSRC in-
troduced two other lottery systems, one based on unlimited number 
of application forms and the other on unlimited number of special 
savings deposit certificates. Unlimited number of application forms 
and special savings deposit certificates were supplied, respectively, 
to investors to subscribe, and shares were allocated by lot. More-
over, the CSRC’s October 20, 1995 notice recommended a lottery 
system based on quantity bids, where investors were required to 
open and save enough money in special saving accounts and could 
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bid for shares at affordable amount backed up by the saving depos-
its. This system has been widely used since 1995.
Owing to the lucrative returns, investors were eager to subscribe 
to IPOs. In order to direct investors to the secondary securities mar-
ket, the CSRC published a notice on February 13, 2000, allowing 
issuers and underwriters to allocate half of the issued shares to cur-
rent secondary securities market investors. This was under a fixed 
price lottery mechanism and shares were allocated by drawing lots 
in case of over-subscription. 35 out of 137 A-share IPOs adopted 
this allocation mechanism during year 2000. But it ceased operation 
after year 2000 for technical problems. On 20 May 2002, the CSRC 
resumed this mechanism and adjusted the percentage that could be 
allocated to the secondary securities market investors from 50% to 
100%.  In practice, almost all issuers may allocate all their issued 
shares to the secondary securities market. 
Furthermore, two pro rata mechanisms were introduced by the 
CSRC on 16 December 1996. Investors were required to save enough 
money to subscribe to shares in special accounts. And IPO shares 
were allocated pro rata in case of over-subscription. These two pro 
rata mechanisms were widely adopted in 1996 and 1997, but were 
not used after 1998.
Alternatively several auctions were experimented in 1994 and 
1995. Issuers and underwriters set an initial price and investors 
were required to bid for both price and quantity. The final offer price 
was set at the level where the accumulative quantities demanded 
by investors were equal to the total number of new shares avail-
able.   However, only four IPOs listed between June 1994 and Janu-
ary 1995 adopted this auction mechanism and all of the first closing 
market prices fell below the offer prices.
Regarding the book-building system, it was first introduced on 28 
July 1999 with a view to allowing issuers and underwriters to set an 
initial offer price range and to decide the final price after receiving 
feedback from investors. However, the final offer price must fall in 
the price range approved by the CSRC. Exceptional cases were to be 
specially approved by the CSRC. 31 (3 in 1999 and 28 in 2000) is-
suers adopted the book-building system since September 21, 1999. 
This book-building system ceased operation in late 2000. Since its 
restoration on November 6, 2001, the book-building approach was 
used by almost all IPOs issued in 2001 and the first 5 months in 
2002 until the CSRC required issuers to allocate shares to the sec-
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ondary market investors in May 2002. 
Notwithstanding the cancellation of annual IPO quota and re-
adoption of the book-building, the year 2001 witnessed another fun-
damental change in the Chinese IPO market: namely the introduc-
tion of the over-allotment option for up to 15% of the shares offered 
on September 3, 2001. Such an option has been commonly used in 
many mature securities markets. Apparently the Chinese IPO mar-




In this section, we first describe the source and characteristics of 
sample data, then summarize the steps in choosing matching firms 
and finally the IPO valuations based on comparable firm multiples.
  
The Data 
The period under study is from January 1997 to December 1998. 
The reasons for choosing this period in this study are two. First, 
since its establishment in the early 1990s, the Chinese stock market 
had experienced several changes in regard to the share offering 
mechanism, and moved to the online fixed price offering method 
in 1994 which became the major offering method since 1996. 
And since 1999, the CSRC implemented several new regulations 
including imposing a ceiling on the PE ratio and adopting the 
book-building system. Therefore, the chosen study period would 
be more appropriate for us to assess the role played by the CSRC 
in under-valuing Chinese A-share IPOs at offering and investigate 
the factors that contributed to the under-pricing of IPOs in China. 
This is supported by our exercise when examining those IPOs that 
are launched in the period from March 2000 to August 2001 when 
CSRC cancelled the offering price regulation. Second, our choice of 
the study period is also to ensure proper selection of matching firms 
and to spare enough duration to gauge the after-listing performance 
of IPOs of A-shares listed on SHSE and SZSE, respectively. To be 
included in the study sample, an IPO must satisfy the following 
criteria slightly adopted from those used by Kim and Ritter (1999) 
and Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) to suit the market 
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environment in China:
1. The IPO should have an offer price higher than 1 RMB;
2. The IPO should be a non-financial company;
3.  The IPO should have information on underwriter, allocation 
method, ballot ratio, and P/E ratio in the prospectus; 
4.  The IPO should have information on revenue from main 
operation, operating profit, and net profit for the prior fiscal 
year; and
5.  The IPO should have an appropriate matching firm in the same 
industry that was listed prior to the year when the IPO was 
offered.
There are 312 A-share IPOs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges during the period of study. We collect matching 
firms’ revenue from main operation, operating profit, net profit, 
earnings per share and state and legal entity ownership data 
from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database and from offer prospectus and listing prospectus of IPOs, 
respectively. However, we drop 43 samples as their P/E ratios and/
or ballot ratios are not available.     
Choosing Matching Firms 
We adopt the matching approach of Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004) with adjustments according to the context 
of IPOs in China. Like these researchers, we select the reasonably 
comparable firms subjectively from the pool of industry peers based 
on their closeness with the IPOs in terms of revenue from main 
operation and net profit. Revenue from main operation and net profit 
are used to ensure that the IPOs and matching firms have similar 
size and profitability, respectively. Besides these benchmark criteria, 
we also pick the comparable firms by industry, price-to-earning (P/
E) ratio and state and legal entity ownership as alternative matching 
criteria. This is because earnings per share and government 
ownership play important roles in valuing Chinese stocks. Both the 
benchmark and the alterative matching criteria yield similar IPO 
valuations. Details are provided in Section 4.2. However, we do not 
match the price-to-forecasted earnings multiple for two reasons. 
First, Chen and Firth (1999) show that profits forecast in the offer 
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prospectuses are only moderately accurate although better than 
time series extrapolations of historical profits. Second, the forecasted 
profits are not available in the CSMAR database. 
Steps in choosing a matching firm for each IPO in our sample 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the 230 A-share IPOs
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of IPOs 
Variable Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev.
Offer Price (RMB)



















     1.68
   
330.77
     2.53
     1.39
Panel B: Characteristics of IPO Firms and Matching Firms
IPO Firms Matching Firms    
Mean Median Max Min
Std. 
Dev.






666.90 331.08 8513.20 16.25 1137.70 636.78 300.43 12127.00 51.72 1361.60
Operating Profit 
(Millions of RMB)
85.72 50.79 920.16 9.81 119.79 62.38 40.62 885.93 2.98 90.41
Net Profit 
(Millions of RMB)




65.16 66.67 84.99 30.47 9.68 64.34 64.73 90.00 30.82 9.85
Note:  Panel A provides descriptive statistics of IPOs. P/E ratio stands for 
offer price/earnings per share. Ballot ratio is number of shares issued/
number of shares subscribed. Offer price and proceeds numbers are 
collected from CSMAR database, and most of ballot ratio and P/E ratio 
numbers are collected from the offer prospectus and listing prospectus 
of IPOs, with few from http://www.cninfo.com.cn/. Panel B compares 
IPO firms and matching firms. Revenue from main operation, operating 
profit, and net profit numbers of matching firms are collected from the 
CSMAR database, and those of IPO firms from offer prospectus and 
listing prospectus of IPOs. State and legal entity ownership is collected 
from the CSMAR database.
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under the benchmark case are briefly described as follows. First, 
we collect information on industry, revenue from main operation 
and net profit of the IPO from its offer prospectus and the CSMAR 
database. Then we locate the corresponding industry peers 
listed before the year when the IPO was offered from the CSMAR 
database. The CSMAR adopts the CSRC’s industry classification 
in 2001. Finally, we collect information on revenue from main 
operation and net profit for all the industry peers and select an 
appropriate matching firm based on its closeness with the IPO in 
terms of these three criteria. When two or more matching firms 
are possible, we select the one that has similar net profit as the 
IPO in question. Nevertheless, we are unable to identify reasonably 
satisfactory matching firms for 39 IPOs. Consequently, 230 out of 
these identified 312 IPOs are selected as the resultant sample in our 
study. 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the summary statistics of IPOs under 
offer price, proceeds, ballot ratio and P/E ratio, respectively. As 
can be observed, the mean and median ballot ratios are 1.59% and 
0.75%, implying a high demand for IPOs. In addition, the mean, 
median, and standard deviation of P/E ratios are 14.66, 14.50, and 
1.39 respectively. Apparently most issuers gauge the P/E ratios 
by the upper limit of the P/E ratio set by CSRC. Panel B of Table 
1 displays the characteristics of individual IPO firms and their 
corresponding matching firms. As expected, individual firms and 
their matching firms have similar mean and median revenue from 
main operation, net profit, and state and legal entity ownership 
since the matching firms are selected according to features similar 
to the individual firms. 
IPO Valuation Using Price Multiples
For each IPO firm, we obtain three price-to-value (P/V) ratios 
based on the offer price (P) and fair value (V) computed from the 
matching firm’s market multiples and the IPO firm’s revenue from 
main operation, operating profit, and net profit, respectively. These 
ratios are obtained by dividing the IPO offer price multiples by the 
matching firm’s market multiples. That is:













  (1) 
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where RMO refers to revenue from main operation. OP refers to op-
erating profit and NP refers to net profit. Offer price multiples for 
IPOs are computed as follows:








= × Price  Outstanding
Prior Fiscal Year RMO








= × Price  Outstanding
Prior Fiscal Year OP
 








= × Price  Outstanding
Prior Fiscal Year NP
where Shares Outstanding refers to shares outstanding after the is-
suance of IPO and Prior Fiscal Year refers to the year before the offer 
year of IPO. The price multiples for matching firms are computed as 
below:








= × Price  Outstanding
Prior Fiscal Year RMO








= × Price  Outstanding
Prior Fiscal Year OP
 








= × Price  Outstanding
Prior Fiscal Year NP
where Market Price and Shares Outstanding refer to closing price 
and shares outstanding of the matching firm on the day before the 
offer date of the IPO.
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IPO VALUATION ADEQUACY AND ROBUSTNESS
In what follows we highlight special features of IPO valuations, 
including hypothesis testing of P/V ratios. Then we compare 
valuation adequacy of the price multiples under the offer price 
and the first closing market price, respectively. Finally we conduct 
sensitivity analysis of findings in the benchmark case using different 
stock exchanges location, classification of firms, matching criteria, 
absence of CSRC regulation and presence of B-share market price, 
respectively.      
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of offer price-
to-value (P/V) ratios of 230 IPOs based on price multiples. As can 
be observed, the mean (median) P/V ratios based on P/RMO, P/
OP, and P/NP multiples are 0.56 (0.49), 0.45 (0.43), and 0.52 (0.48), 
Table 2. IPO Valuation based on Price Multiples 
Panel A: P/V Ratios Based on Price Multiples






























Panel B: Correlation among P/V Ratios













Note:  This table reports offer price-to-value (P/V) ratios, computed based on 
market price-to-revenue from main operation (P/RMO), market price-
to-operating profit (P/OP), and market price-to-net profit (P/NP) of 
a matching firm. An appropriate matching firm is selected based on 
its closeness with the IPO in terms of revenue from main operation, 
operating profit, and net profit. Panel A presents descriptive statistics 
of P/V ratios based on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP multiples. The 
Wilcoxon p-value corresponds to the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the 
null hypothesis that the median is equal to 1. Panel B presents the 
correlation coefficients among the P/V ratios based on P/RMO, P/OP, 
and P/NP multiples.
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respectively. The standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of P/V 
ratios based on P/OP multiple are much smaller than those based 
on P/RMO and P/NP multiples.
We also compute p-values for the Wilcoxon signed rank test that 
under the null hypothesis the median P/V ratio is equal to 1. As can 
be seen from the last column of Panel A, these p-values are all less 
than 0.001, thereby implying that based on the sample data, the 
null hypothesis is rejected for all three price multiples even at the 1% 
level of significance. Overall, our results indicate that A-share IPOs 
in the Chinese markets are severely under-valued at the offer. 
Moreover, Panel B of Table 2 displays the pair-wise sample 
correlation coefficients among P/V ratios between P/RMO, P/
OP, and P/NP multiples. As can be gleaned, all the correlation 
coefficients are positive but relatively weak, with magnitudes less 
than 0.33. In particular, correlation between P/V ratios based 
on P/RMO and P/NP multiples (0.13) is much lower than their 
correlations with P/V ratios based on P/OP multiple (0.28 and 0.32 
respectively). A valid concern is whether P/OP multiple perform 
better than the other two multiples in IPO valuation? We address 
this issue in the next section.  
Valuation Adequacy
To compare valuation adequacy of the price multiples under the 
benchmark case, we compute similar price-to-value ratios (P/V) 
for each IPO based on its first closing market price. These 3 ratios 
are same as those computed based on offer price described in 
equations (1)-(3). The first closing market price multiples for IPOs 
are computed as follows:









'  Closing Market Price  Outstanding
Prior Fiscal Year RMO









'  Closing Market Price  Outstanding
Prior Fiscal Year OP
 









'  Closing Market Price  Outstanding
Prior Fiscal Year NP
where Shares Outstanding refers to shares outstanding on the 
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listing day of IPO and Prior Fiscal Year refers to the year before the 
year when IPO is listed. The price multiples for matching firm can 
be computed accordingly as described in Section 3.2.
In addition, we compute valuation errors for each IPOs in order to 
rank the performance of their price multiples. We follow Kaplan and 
Ruback (1995) and Kim and Ritter (1999) to define valuation errors 
as the natural logarithm of the inverse of P/V ratios. For example, 
valuation error of the P/OP multiple is log(V/P)OP, which is the 
difference between log(P/OP)Match and log(P/OP)IPO. Panel A of Table 
3 displays valuation errors of the price multiples. Both mean and 
median valuation errors for the P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP multiples 
are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Panel B of 
Table 3 reports the absolute prediction errors and the percentage 
of valuation errors within 15%. The percentage of valuation errors 
within 15% is computed as |log(V/P)|≤15%. As can be observed, the 
mean absolute valuation error for the P/NP price multiple is only 
35%, the lowest among three multiples. The percentage of valuation 
Table 3. Valuation Errors
Panel A: Valuation Errors





























Panel B: Absolute Valuation Errors

























Note:  This table presents valuation errors, measured as the natural logarithm 
of the inverse of P/V ratios. We also report the absolute valuation errors 
and the percentage of prediction errors within 15%. The percentage of 
valuation errors within 15% is computed as |log(V/P)|≤15%. T-test 
p-value corresponds to test for mean equal to 0. Wilcoxon p-value 
corresponds to the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the null hypothesis that 
the median is equal to 0.
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errors within 15% for the P/OP price multiple is about the same 
order of magnitude as that for P/NP, and both are considerably 
higher than that for P/RMO. Such a battery of evidence indicates 
that the P/NP multiple performs the best, followed by P/OP and 
P/RMO consecutively. Our findings are consistent with Liu et al. 
(1999). One possible reason for the worst performance of the P/
RMO multiple may be that RMO is a measurement of sales, rather 
than earnings which are often used by practitioners as a popular 
valuation indicator.  
Robustness of P/V Ratios
In order to check the sensitivity of our findings under the bench-
mark case, we compute the P/V ratios based on P/RMO, P/OP and 
P/NP multiples across: (a) two classification of firms, namely: tech-
nology and non-technology; (b) two exchanges, including SHSE and 
SZSE stock exchanges; (c) alternative criteria for choosing matching 
firms; (d) absence of CSRC regulation; and (e) B-share market pric-
es, respectively.  
We divide our sample IPOs into technology firms and non-technol-
ogy firms. We classify technology firms as those belong to Electron-
ics Manufacturing, Medicine and Biological Products Manufacturing, 
Information Technology, Motion Picture and Sound Recording, Radio, 
Film, and Television, and Information Services in the CSRC’s indus-
try classifications (2001). The rest are regarded as non-technology. 
As can be observed from Table 4, out of the 230 IPOs under study, 
27 IPOs are grouped as technology and 203 as non-technology. The 
computed mean P/V ratios based on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP mul-
tiples are: 0.57, 0.45 and 0.45 for technology firms; and they are 
0.56, 0.45 and 0.53 for non-technology firms, respectively. The cor-
responding small p-values warrant rejection of the null hypothesis 
that the mean price to value ratio is equal to 1. This implies that 
IPOs are under-priced in different classification of technology.
As regards IPOs listed in various exchanges, we decompose the 
230 IPOs under study into 110 IPOs issued in SHSE and 120 issued 
in SZSE. As can be seen from Table 4, the computed mean P/V 
ratios based on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP multiples are: 0.56, 0.43 
and 0.49 for IPOs listed on SHSE; and they are 0.57, 0.46 and 0.55 
for those listed on SZSE, respectively. Similarly, the small p-values 
indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that the mean price to value 
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ratio is equal to 1. This provides some support for under-pricing of 
IPOs under-priced in different stock exchanges.
Turning to alternative matching criteria, we select matching firms 
based on industry, earnings per share and state and legal entity 
ownership. Earnings per share rather than net profit are used 
here because price-to-earning ratio is often regarded as a popular 
indicator by investors in China. As can be observed from Table 5, 
the computed mean P/V ratios under the alternative criteria are 
higher than those under the benchmark as displayed in Table 2. In 
addition, the median P/V ratios based on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP 
multiples are very similar. For example, they are 0.49, 0.44 and 0.53 
under the alternative criteria and are 0.49, 0.43 and 0.48 under 
the benchmark. Like the benchmark case, the very small Wilcoxon 
p-values indicate that the null hypotheses that the median P/V 
ratios are equal to 1 are all rejected at the 1% level of significance. 
This implies that under-pricing of IPOs is reasonably robust to the 
choice of matching firms by industry, earnings per share and state 
and legal entity ownership. 
Moreover, it has often been argued that undervaluation of IPOs 
may be influenced by the CSRC regulation which stipulates that 
the offer price should not exceed 15 times of earning per share 
of the issuing firm. In other words, issuers and underwriters 
may be prompted to undervalue the IPOs. We address this issue 
by examining those IPOs that are launched in the period from 




SHSE P-value SZSE P-value Tech P-value Non-Tech P-value




























Note:  This table reports the mean offer price-to-value (P/V) ratios in different 
exchanges and in firms. Technology firms refer to Electronics 
Manufacturing, Medicine and Biological Products Manufacturing, 
Information Technology, Motion Picture and Sound Recording, Radio, 
Film, and Television, and Information Services in the CSRC’s industry 
classifications. P-value corresponds to the t-test for the null hypothesis 
that the mean is equal to 1.
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March 2000 to August 2001 when CSRC cancelled the offering 
price regulation. In the absence of CSRC regulation, 190 A-share 
IPOs were issued during this period. We are able to identify the 
appropriate matching firms for 167 IPOs based on industry, net 
profit, and state and legal entity ownership. The mean and median 
P/E ratios of these 167 IPOs are 34.26 and 33.29 respectively, 
which are much higher than those of IPOs listed in 1997 and 1998. 
As can be observed from Table 6, these IPOs are also undervalued. 
The median P/V ratios are 0.46, 0.45, and 0.51 respectively, and 
p-values for the Wilcoxon signed rank test are low enough to 
warrant rejection of the null hypothesis that P/V ratios are equal 
to 1 at the 1% level of significance. Hence, we find evidence that in 
the absence of CSRC regulation, IPOs are still undervalued by the 
issuers and underwriters.
Although IPOs are commonly undervalued with respect to their 
Table 5. IPO Valuation Using Matching Criteria of Industry, Earnings per 
Share, and State and Legal Entity Ownership
Panel A: P/V Ratios Based on Price Multiples






P/RMO 0.76 0.49 6.47 0.06 0.83 3.37 18.93 0.0000
P/OP 0.52 0.44 4.75 0.03 0.46 5.50 42.71 0.0000
P/NP 0.61 0.53 5.30 0.15 0.53 6.26 48.02 0.0000














Note:  This table reports offer price-to-value (P/V) ratios under the matching 
criteria of industry, earnings per share, and state and legal entity 
ownership. These ratios are computed based on market price-to-revenue 
from main operation (P/RMO), market price-to-operating profit (P/OP), 
and market price-to-net profit (P/NP) of a matching firm. A matching 
firm is selected based on its closeness with the IPO in terms of industry, 
earnings per share, and state and legal entity ownership. Wilcoxon 
p-value corresponds to the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the null 
hypothesis that the median is equal to 1. 
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A-share peers, it is interesting to see whether the same applies when 
they are compared to their B-share market prices. The main idea 
is to select a sub-sample of IPOs that also issue B-shares and see 
whether the conclusions are still valid. In our sample of 230 IPOs, 
6 firms issue B-shares prior to the A-share IPOs. The mean and 
median P/V ratios for these 6 IPOs are 1.34 and 1.27 respectively. 
Indeed, 5 out of these 6 IPOs are overvalued and only one is 
slightly undervalued with respect to their B-share price. This is 
not surprising as it is well-known that A-share stocks in China are 
characterized with high speculation and there is a large difference 
between A- and B-share market valuations. With some preliminary 
study, we find support for undervaluation of A-share IPOs based 
on their A-share market, but overvaluation of A-shares IPOs with 
respect to the B-share peers.    
Furthermore, we investigate the possible relationship of P/V ratios 
with P/E ratios and the relationship of P/V ratios with ballot ratios 
based on three types of IPO portfolios: high P/V portfolio, medium 
P/V portfolio, and low P/V portfolio. We first sort IPOs by P/V ratios 
and allot the first 77 IPOs with the highest P/V ratios to the group 
of high P/V portfolio, the last 77 IPOs with the lowest P/V ratios to 
the group of low P/V portfolio, and the rest to the group of medium 
P/V portfolio. Table 7 reports P/E ratios and ballot ratios for these 
three groups of P/V portfolios. We omit results for the P/V portfolios 
computed by the P/RMO price multiple because it provides the 
Table 6. Valuation of IPOs Issued without the CSRC Offering Price 
Regulation

































Note:  This table reports the offer price-to-value (P/V) ratios of IPOs issued 
without the CSRC offering price regulation. These ratios are computed 
based on market price-to-revenue from main operation (P/RMO), market 
price-to-operating profit (P/OP), and market price-to-net profit (P/NP) 
of a matching firm. A matching firm is selected based on its closeness 
with the IPO in terms of industry, net profit, and state and legal entity 
ownership. Wilcoxon p-value corresponds to the Wilcoxon signed rank 
test for the null hypothesis that the median is equal to 1. 
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worst performance among the P/OP and P/NP price multiples. As 
can be gleaned from Table 7, all the medium P/V ratios, P/E ratios, 
ballot ratios and IR (initial return) ratios based on the P/OP multiple 
are very close to those under the P/NP multiple for low, medium and 
high P/V portfolios, respectively. In addition, P/V ratios are expected 
to be positively correlated with P/E ratios in the prospectuses since 
the P/E ratio is a commonly used valuation indicator. Also, P/V 
ratios are expected to be positively correlated with ballot ratios as 
investors tend to pick severely under-valued IPOs for higher returns. 
Surprisingly, we find small difference in P/E ratios and ballot ratios 
between the low P/V portfolio and high P/V portfolio. However, 
p-values for the Wilcoxon signed rank test are very high, with 
magnitudes larger than 0.10. Apparently we do not find evidence to 
support that P/V ratios are positively correlated with P/E ratios and 
with ballot ratios, respectively.
UNDER-PRICING AND LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE
As discussed in Section 4, we have found consistent evidence 
that A-share IPOs are severely under-priced on the listing day. In 
addition, the mean offer price-to-value ratios based on P/RMO, P/
OP and P/NP multiples are significantly less than 1. Hence, such 
under-pricing may be caused by the under-valuation of IPOs. If it 
is the case, those IPOs that are most under-valued should earn the 
highest first-day returns. In other words, the lower the offer price-
to-value ratios, the higher the first-day returns. In what follows we 
shall test this hypothesis by studying the relationship between P/V 
ratios and the first-day returns.  
PV Ratios and Initial Returns 
The first-day returns of IPOs (or initial return, IR) relative to the 
SHSE/SZSE A-share prices and market indices can be computed by 
the following:
               













              (7)    
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where PMarket and POffer are the first day closing market price and 
offer price of IPO, respectively. IMarket is the A-share index of the 
exchange market where the IPO is listed on the listing day of IPO. 
IOffer is the A-share index prior to the offer date of IPO. The Wilcoxson 
signed rank test is used to test the null hypothesis of equality 
of medians and the t-test is used to check whether the low P/V 
portfolio and the high P/V portfolio have the same mean.
As can be observed from the last row of Table 7, the median and 
mean initial returns of the 230 IPOs under study are 125.8% and 
139.24%, respectively. This under-pricing is consistent with those 
reported by Chan, Wei, and Wang (2001), Wu (2001), and Chi and 
Padgett (2002b). In addition, differences between the median initial 
returns for the low P/V portfolio and high P/V portfolio based on 
the P/OP and P/NP multiples are 37.75% and 43.98%, respectively, 
which are significantly greater than zero by the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test. Indeed, differences between the mean initial returns are 
even larger and significantly greater than zero. As such, our findings 
provide support that undervaluation may contribute to under-
pricing.
Moreover, high demand may lead to the severe under-pricing of 
A-share IPOs, which is regarded as a source of under-pricing of 
IPO in Chi and Padgett (2002b) and Gu (2003). We investigate this 
conjecture using the first closing market price-to-value ratios of 
IPOs. If investors over-value IPOs, the first closing market price-
to-value ratios should be greater than 1. Table 8 presents the 
results for P/V ratios on the listing day of IPOs. The t-test is used 
to check the null hypothesis that the mean is equal to 1 and the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test to check whether the median is equal to 1, 
respectively. 
As can be observed from Table 8, the mean and median P/V ratios 
based on the P/OP multiple are (1.06, 0.95), respectively, thereby 
failing to reject the null hypotheses that these ratios are equal to 1. 
In contrast, the mean and median P/V ratios based on the P/RMO 
and P/NP multiples are (1.33, 1.11) and (1.20, 1.12), respectively, 
thereby rejecting the null hypotheses that mean and median P/
V ratios are equal to 1 at the 1% level of significance. Moreover, 
we note that the percentages of P/V ratios that are greater than 1 
for the P/RMO and P/NP multiples are roughly 60%, but that for 
the P/OP price multiple is only 45%. As such, these three price 
multiples do not agree on whether investors over-react on the listing 
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day of IPO. On balance, we prefer findings based on the P/NP price 
multiple since it provides the best performance in IPO valuation. As 
such, we are more inclined to report that both under-valuation by 
issuers and underwriters and over-valuation by investors contribute 
to the severe under-pricing of A-share IPOs.
Long-run Performance
While investors overvalue A-share IPOs on the listing day, 
they may become rational enough to value IPOs based on the 
fundamentals in the long-run. We test this rationality hypothesis by 
looking at the relationship between the first closing market price-
to-value ratios and the cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(CARs) of IPOs with respect to two benchmarks: the SHSE/SZSE 
A-share market and their matching firms. The cumulative buy-and-
hold returns for IPO firm i and its benchmark m are computed using 
the conventional formulas:
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Table 8. P/V Ratios on the Listing Day of IPOs 





































Note:  This table reports the first closing market price-to-value (P/V) ratios 
computed based on market price-to-revenue from main operation (P/
RMO), market price-to-operating profit (P/OP), and market price-to-net 
profit (P/NP) of a matching firm, respectively. A matching firm is selected 
based on its closeness with the IPO in terms of revenue from main 
operation, operating profit, and net profit. T-test p-value corresponds to 
the t-test for the null hypothesis that the mean is equal to 1. Wilcoxon 
p-value corresponds to the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the null 
hypothesis that the median is equal to 1.
An Empirical Assessment of A-Share IPO Under-Pricing in China 51
where T is the holding month, rit is the monthly buy-and-hold 
return of IPO, and rmt is the monthly return of benchmark market 
(value-weighted) or matching firm. rit and rmt are adjusted for stock 
dividends, stock splits, and rights offerings. We assume there are 
20 trading days for one month. CAR is the difference between the 
cumulative buy-and-hold returns of IPO and the benchmark, i.e.,
                             CAR R RiT iT mT= − .
CAR up to month T is computed as the mean CAR of all IPOs up to 
month T:










where N is the number of IPOs in our sample. All the daily and 
monthly returns are collected from the CSMAR database.
Table 9 reports the CARs of IPOs up to 36 months with respect 















Buy-and-hold Return of IPO Market Adjusted CAR Matching Firm Adjusted CAR
Note:  The chart graphs the cumulative buy-and-hold returns of IPOs and buy-
and-hold abnormal returns of IPOs with respect to the market and their 
matching firms.     
Figure 2. Long-run Cumulative Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns (CARs) of 
IPOs
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Table 9. The Long-run Performance of Chinese A-share IPOs





























































































































































































































































Note:  This table presents the long-run performance of Chinese A-share IPOs 
after listing. We assume that there are 20 trading days in one month. Ret 
is the monthly return of IPOs; Mktret is the monthly return of A-share 
stock market; Matret is the monthly return of matching firm; Cumret 
is the cumulative return of IPO; Mkt Adjret is the market adjusted 
cumulative return of IPO; Mat Adjret is the matching firm adjusted 
cumulative return of IPO. * and ** represent the significance level at 10% 
and 5%, respectively.
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CARs are slightly below zero in the first five month after listing. The 
market-adjusted CAR increases steadily after the 5th month and 
reaches around 30% at the end of the 3-year holding period. See 
Figure 2. Our results are consistent with Chan et al. (2001) who also 
find 25% out-performance of IPOs with respect to the market after 
36 months of listing. 
However, the CARs with respect to matching firms are slightly 
above zero after the 5th month and less than zero since the 25th 
month. At the end of the 3-year holding period, IPOs under-
perform their matching firms by 25%. These findings imply that 
our matching firms also out-perform the market as a whole. The 
main reason may be that IPOs have good accounting records 
before their listings as required by the CSRC and we match IPOs 
on the accounting items. Hence, our matching firms have better 
profitability and outperform the market as a whole.
Table 10 reports the mean values of unadjusted and adjusted 
CARs up to 12, 24, and 36 holding months for IPO portfolios based 
on P/V ratios using the P/NP multiple on the listing day of IPO. The 
t-test is used to test the null hypothesis that means of the low and 
high P/V portfolios are equal; whereas the alternative hypothesis 
is that the mean of the low P/V portfolio is greater than that of the 
high P/V portfolio. As can be observed, differences between the 
mean values of CARs for the low and high P/V portfolios are all 
positive. In particular, the 12 and 24 months CARs with respect to 
matching firm are significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
It is not surprising since the P/V ratios are computed using values 
based on matching firms. The positive difference between mean 
values of CARs for the low and high P/V portfolios provides evidence 
that under-valued IPOs with low P/V ratios on the listing day 
outperform those over-valued IPOs with high P/V ratios in the long-
run.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have examined the pricing of 230 A-share IPOs 
in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 1997 to 1998 
using comparative firm multiples. We find some evidence of under-
valuation of IPOs by issuers and underwriters, but over-valuation 
of such IPOs by investors on the listing day. Our findings are 
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consistent with previous studies based on characteristics of the 
Chinese A-share IPO markets. In addition, our results are robust 
across stock exchanges, classification of firms, alternative criteria for 
choosing matching firms; absence of CSRC regulation and B-share 
market prices, respectively.    
We also rank the performance of price multiples using valuation 
errors. We find that the P/NP multiple performs the best, followed 
by P/OP and P/RMO consecutively. It is unexpected that the P/
NP multiple performs better than the P/OP multiple since the 
operating profit is a more reliable measurement of profitability than 
the net profit.  One possible caveat is that we do not use the price-
to-forecasted profits multiple in valuating IPOs as the forecasted 
accounting profits data for matching firms are not available.
Turning to the long-run performance, we detect a 30% out-
performance of IPOs with respect to the market after 36 months of 
listing. But IPOs under-perform their matching firms by 25% after 
36 months of listing. It implies that the matching firms also out-
perform the market, partly due to the selection criteria for matching 
firms. We also find evidence that those IPOs over-valued by investors 
on the listing day under-perform those under-valued IPOs in the 
long-run. 
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